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Regional cooperation in Southeastern Europe (SEE) is of even greater importance 
today, in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict, than a few years ago. The various 
initiatives to stimulate regional cooperation in SEE in the 1990s have not yet led to any 
significant results. On the contrary, the lack of regional cooperation has seriously 
undermined peace and stability in SEE, contributing to several armed conflicts in the 
region, including the most recent war in Kosovo March through June 1999. Not 
surprisingly, the international community’s latest initiative, the Stability Pact for 
Southeastern Europe, adopted 10 June 1999 in Cologne, again relies on regional 
cooperation as one of the most important instruments for bringing lasting peace and 
stability to this part of Europe.  
 
This paper discusses some aspects, primarily economic, of regional cooperation in SEE. 
For the purposes of this paper, SEE will include seven transition countries: Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM), Romania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), although Slovenia 
will also occasionally be considered. The paper first examines the question of economic 
integration in SEE by looking at past and present trade links among SEE countries. It 
then considers various initiatives aimed at stimulating regional cooperation, including EU 
policies toward the SEE region. Finally, the paper discusses the main reasons that 
closer economic ties among SEE countries should actively be encouraged, followed by 
some concluding remarks. 
 
 
HOW INTEGRATED IS THE SEE REGION? 
 
How integrated is the SEE region today? This question can not be properly addressed 
without taking into account the historical context, namely the level of integration in SEE 
in 1989 on the eve of transition, and the major political and economic developments that 
have fundamentally influenced relations among SEE countries in the 1990s.  
 
When the transition to a market economy began in 1989, the general situation in SEE 
was very different than it is today (see Table 1). At that time, five countries in the SEE 
region were in an economic union within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYROM, Slovenia and FRY, then represented by the 
two republics Serbia and Montenegro) and as such, had substantial trade and other 
economic links. Yugoslavia was the most developed and the largest country in SEE, in 
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terms of both territory and population. Because of its specific position in international 
economic relations, it was less dependent than its SEE neighbors on trade with the other 
socialist countries (Uvalic, 1992). Bulgaria and Romania for several decades had been 
members of the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) and therefore had a 
higher proportion of trade with the other socialist countries, especially Bulgaria, the 
country most dependent on intra-CMEA trade. Finally, Albania was the most closed 
economy in Europe. After abandoning CMEA in the early 1960s, it followed its own 
autarkic development strategy for many years and had limited economic links with the 
rest of the world, including its closest neighbors.  
 
In 1989 relatively little trade existed among SEE countries (see Table 1). In the case of 
Bulgaria, 13.4 per cent of its exports went to and 6.5 per cent of its imports came from 
the other two major SEE countries, Romania and Yugoslavia.1 Regional trade was even 
less important for the rest of the SEE countries. The share of the three SEE countries in 
Romania’s exports and imports in 1989 amounted to only 3.2 per cent and 4.4 per cent, 
respectively, and even less in Yugoslavia’s (2.1 per cent of the exports and 2.2 per cent 
of imports). These very low shares of mutual trade show that despite geographical 
proximity, the SEE region in 1989 was not at all economically integrated, except for 
economic links within former Yugoslavia. At that time, the SEE region actually consisted 
of two subregions: the first, relatively integrated, encompassed the economies of the six 
republics of former Yugoslavia, and the second, characterized by very weak mutual 
trade links, comprised the other three SEE countries. Trade flows between the two SEE 
subregions were negligible.  
 
                                                           
1 Bulgarian foreign trade with Albania in 1989 is not considered, since no data is reported in IMF statistics; it is possible that the 
amounts were negligible. 
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Table 1. Some indicators on SEE countries in 1989  
 Area 
(in 000 sq. 
km) 
Population 
(mln 1990) 
GDP/cap 
(1989 
US$) 
Exports to 
CMEA 
% 
Imports 
from 
CMEA 
% 
Exports to 
SEE  
% 
Imports 
from SEE 
% 
Albania 28.7 3.2 723 46.3 44.8 n.a. n.a. 
Bulgaria 110.9 8.9 2,320 83.0 71.5 13.4 6.5 
Romania 237.5 23.2 1,730 40.5 38.5 3.2 4.4 
SFRY 255.8 23.8 2,490 29.9 26.3 2.1 2.2 
Source: Uvalic (1997c) based on various sources (World Bank, OECD, UNECE, IMF, EIU).2 
 
Therefore, in 1989, the most integrated part of the SEE region was former Yugoslavia — 
paradoxically, since many political and economic problems had for years pushed in the 
opposite direction. Since the mid-1970s, rising regional autarky and fragmentation 
characterized the Yugoslav market, evidenced by increasing sales on the local markets, 
duplication of plants in many sectors, impediments to the mobility of capital and labor 
across republican borders and weak interrepublican integration of enterprises (Uvalic, 
1993). Nevertheless, interrepublican trade in former Yugoslavia has always represented 
an important part of overall trade for all its republics. Throughout most of 1970-89, 
“exports” to other Yugoslav republics were more important than exports abroad, 
suggesting that Yugoslav republics were more integrated among themselves than with 
the outside world (Uvalic, 1993).3 A recent study (Udovicki, 1996) showed that market 
forces had strongly resisted Yugoslavia’s political segmentation; the level of integration 
among former Yugoslavia’s regions was found to be similar to that of countries inside a 
common market (for example, the EU),4 while the estimations permitted the author to 
refute the hypothesis of increasing autarky in the Yugoslav republics. Other studies have 
also shown that the level of economic interdependence among Yugoslav republics was 
greater than usually sustained on the basis of purely political arguments (Hinic, 1994). 
                                                           
2 In reporting trade shares with the CMEA countries, it should be noted that problems of pricing of intra-CMEA 
trade, which essentially makes it non-comparable with non-CMEA totals, render estimation of these trade shares 
very hazardous. 
3 The only exception was 1983, when the relative share of exports for all Yugoslav republics was higher than 
interrepublican trade, but this was due to particular circumstances. The widening trade deficit and enormous foreign 
debt had compelled Yugoslav authorities to implement an austerity package in the early 1980s, which provoked a 
serious economic crisis and forced all republics to try to increase exports to foreign markets as much as possible 
(Uvalic, 1992: 10-16; Hinic, 1994: 93). 
4 As suggestively remarked by the author, “Yugoslav regions exhibited an unfortunate level of economic 
interdependence — high enough to make a trade war extremely costly, but not high enough to make it impossible” 
(Udovicki, 1996: 455). 
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In 1987, the last year for which data on interrepublican trade is available, “exports” to the 
other republics represented 13 per cent — 29 per cent of the gross material product 
(GMP)5 of the individual republics, and as such were more important than foreign trade 
for all republics, except for Serbia and Slovenia (see Table 2). It should be noted that the 
oscillations in local, interrepublican and foreign trade were closely related to export 
performance. In times of deteriorating external conditions, the existence of alternative 
internal markets (in the other republics) was an important factor compensating for the 
temporary loss of foreign markets (Uvalic, 1993).  
 
Table 2. Trade by destination of Yugoslav republics in 1987 (in  per cent of GMP) 
Republics of 
SFR Yugoslavia 
Deliveries to the 
local market 
Deliveries to 
markets of other 
republics 
Deliveries 
abroad 
(Exports) 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 56.1 24.2 19.8 
Croatia 67.0 18.7 14.3 
Macedonia 60.8 21.4 17.8 
Montenegro 57.5 25.0 17.5 
Serbia (with K & V) 69.0 13.4 17.6 
Serbia proper 62.3 17.4 20.3 
Kosovo 64.6 24.0 11.4 
Voivodina 58.1 28.8 13.1 
Slovenia 57.5 20.3 22.2 
Source: Uvalic (1993), based on data of the Serbian Institute of Statistics. 
 
Since then, several important political and economic events have fundamentally 
changed the overall situation in SEE. The transition to a market economy and multiparty 
democracy has led to important systemic changes in SEE former socialist countries, 
including radical reforms of the foreign trade system and substantial trade liberalization. 
Other important events have accompanied the transition. In 1989 the G24 group of 
countries — the EU in particular — decided to actively support the transition in former 
socialist countries with a series of measures, including major trade liberalization and 
various forms of financial assistance. The dissolution of the CMEA in 1991 directly 
affected primarily Bulgaria and Romania and fundamentally changed their trade 
orientation. The disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991-92 led to the creation of five 
                                                           
5 GMP, or “social product” in Yugoslav terminology, is the value added of “productive” sectors of the economy, thus 
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separate countries, so that quite contrary to the general trend of trade liberalization 
elsewhere, the newly created states introduced restrictions on trade with their former 
trading partners.  
 
These developments contributed to important changes in regional economic groupings, the position of 
individual SEE countries and their trade patterns. Over the past decade, the EU has emerged as the most 
important trading partner for the large majority of — though not all — SEE countries (see Table 3). 
Albania, Bulgaria and Romania very quickly reoriented trade from their traditional partners toward primarily 
the EU. SFR Yugoslavia, thanks to many years of preferential access to European Community (EC) 
markets, already in 1989 traded mostly with the EC. The majority of its successor states have also made 
the EU their most important trading partner. Given that most SEE countries have substituted traditional 
trading partners almost exclusively with non-SEE countries (primarily the EU), the already marginal links 
between countries of former Yugoslavia and the other SEE countries have in no way been strengthened, 
while trade links among Albania, Bulgaria and Romania have become even weaker.  
 
Here it is of interest to consider the SEE as a single regional trading partner and 
compare its relative importance for SEE countries with that of the EU (see Table 3).6 
Although the figures are approximate, as there is still no comprehensive source of 
foreign trade statistics for all SEE countries, they nevertheless demonstrate that in 1998, 
for Albania, Bulgaria and Romania, trade with other SEE countries was of marginal 
importance. On the contrary, for most countries of former Yugoslavia, trade with other 
SEE countries represents a rather significant portion of overall trade. The breakup of 
Yugoslavia in 1991-92 led to the end of many traditional trade links, the introduction of 
trade and other barriers, several military conflicts, embargoes and the imposition of 
various other restrictions, which all contributed to a drastic reduction in the overall level 
of trade among the newly created states. Yet, despite reductions in absolute trade levels, 
most successor states of former Yugoslavia have maintained some trade with their 
former trading partners, and in a few cases, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and FRY, 
rather significant amounts (see Table 3).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
excluding “nonproductive” sectors such as education, health, defense, banking and other services. 
6 Slovenia is also included in the analysis, due to past trade links with the other countries of former Yugoslavia. 
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Table 3. EU and SEE shares in total trade of SEE countries (in  PER CENT) - 1998 
Country 
(and sources) 
EU share in 
Exports 
 
Imports 
SEE share in 
Exports 
 
Imports 
Albania  
(IMF; BH excluded) 
 
88.8 
 
77.9 
 
3.0 
 
7.2 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 
(BH Central Bank & 
IMF) 
 
21.9 
 
29.5 
 
66.6 
 
52.8 
Bulgaria 
(IMF) 
 
51.7 
 
46.5 
 
7.7 
 
3.4 
Croatia 
(IMF; Albania and FRY 
excluded) 
 
48.7 
 
62.6 
 
25.2 
 
12.2 
FYR Macedonia 
(IMF) 
 
50.3 
 
46.4 
 
23.4 
 
32.8 
Romania 
(IMF; FRY excluded) 
 
64.6 
 
57.9 
 
1.9 
 
1.0 
Slovenia (IMF; FRY 
and imports from 
Croatia excluded) 
 
65.5 
 
69.5 
 
15.1 
 
1.9 
FR Yugoslavia  
(Yugoslav statistics & 
IMF) 
 
32.9 
 
38.7 
 
35.1 
 
16.3 
Source: In calculating these shares, we have mainly used data provided in the IMF Direction of 
Trade Statistics Quarterly (September 1999). Given that for Bosnia and Herzegovina and FR 
Yugoslavia IMF statistics are rather incomplete, they have been integrated with national 
sources: for Bosnia, unpublished data on foreign trade of both entities obtained directly from the 
Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina in mid-January 2000, and for FR Yugoslavia, Index no. 
1, 1999, Federal Statistical Office.  
 
After the signing of the Dayton peace agreement in late 1995, there was a revival of 
trade, especially between Croatia and the Bosnian Federation, and between FRY and 
the Serb part of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republika Srpska). Thus, in 1998, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina actually traded much more with the other SEE countries than with the EU, 
both in terms of exports (67 per cent) and imports (53 per cent); even higher shares 
were registered in 1997 (Gligorov, 1998). FRY in 1998 also exported more to other SEE 
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countries (35 per cent) than to the EU (33 per cent), though its imports from the EU (39 
per cent) were more than double the share of imports from SEE (16 per cent), confirming 
its enormous import dependence, primarily on the EU. There are no other cases where 
the SEE share of trade exceeds the EU share, though in a few cases it is not 
insignificant. For FYROM, 24 per cent of its exports and 33 per cent of its imports in 
1998 were from other SEE countries. Croatia actually exported more in 1998 to the other 
SEE countries (25 per cent of the total) than FYROM, but imported much less (only 12 
per cent of the total). For Slovenia, trade with SEE countries is much less important, yet 
this country in recent years somewhat increased its share of exports to the SEE region, 
from 14.9 per cent in 1995 to 17.1 per cent in 1997 (though the share again fell to 15 per 
cent in 1998).  
 
As indicated, the reported figures on mutual trade in SEE may not be fully accurate, not 
only because different sources of data had to be combined but also because the quality 
of statistics on foreign trade of SEE countries is highly unsatisfactory. In various 
publications reporting foreign trade in SEE, Bosnia and Herzegovina and FRY are either 
not taken into account or the data is incomplete or out-of-date.7 These and other 
omissions (see notes on sources in Table 3) automatically distort total trade figures for 
all SEE countries, particularly of the two countries that today are major trading partners 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina and FRY), and consequently also the respective shares of 
their trade with other SEE countries and with the EU. It is not surprising, then, that even 
important political documents contain incorrect statements.8  
 
Also, due to the recent wars and trade embargoes imposed in the SEE region, there has 
been a substantial amount of smuggling, especially across some of the “soft” borders 
(for example, between Serbia and Republika Srpska, Albania and Kosovo, Croatia and 
Herzegovina). Consequently, a portion of the trade among some SEE countries is illegal, 
sometimes occurring in the form of barter, which is not registered. The reported 
                                                           
7 A main problem is that officially published foreign trade statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina are still incomplete. 
The figures used to calculate the shares in Table 3 are unpublished estimates, obtained directly from the Bosnian 
Central Bank in mid-January 2000, which seem more accurate than data reported in other publications. Due to such an 
unsatisfactory state of Bosnian foreign trade statistics, in the publications of international organizations (for example, 
IMF September 1999 or UNECE 1999, Table 1.3.1), a portion of Bosnian trade, usually between Republika Srpska 
and FRY, is not taken into account, even though the amount is substantial. Similarly, Yugoslavia’s foreign trade is 
only partly included in these publications. Thus, IMF statistics include no data on Yugoslavia’s trade with some SEE 
countries that are today among its major trading partners. Gligorov et al. (1999) present the most complete and 
updated picture of intraregional trade in SEE, though they also do not include recent data on Bosnian-Yugoslav trade 
(see Table 3, p. 59).  
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statistics, therefore, probably underestimate the actual amount of regional trade in SEE. 
These considerations have important implications for the level of intraregional SEE trade 
today, undoubtedly higher than is usually concluded on the basis of rather incomplete 
statistics. 
 
The war in FRY significantly disrupted trade in all SEE countries in 1999. By destroying 
or damaging the infrastructure, transportation and communication lines in FRY, NATO 
bombardments further divided SEE, creating trade, ecological and transportation 
disturbances throughout the region. However, precisely because of these regionwide 
consequences of the war, there is major interdependence among the SEE countries 
today (Minic, 1999). At the same time, additional disintegration has taken place in FRY. 
After the end of the 1999 military conflict, it practically lost territorial control over Kosovo, 
whereas Montenegro is steadily moving towards full independence, especially after the 
November 1999 decision to introduce the Deutschmark as a parallel currency. 
 
Today, the SEE region is therefore even less economically integrated than a decade 
ago, but there are many reasons for this, including historical legacies. The fact that the 
SEE was not very integrated in 1989 — except for the area of former Yugoslavia — had 
been determined to a large extent by non-economic factors: historical, political, 
geostrategic and ideological (including the existence of the CMEA, the specific position 
of Yugoslavia and the autarkic policies of Albania). These factors were clearly more 
important than any purely economic interests in determining economic relations and 
trade patterns of SEE countries. Similarly today, economic interests may not be the 
primary factor determining trade flows in SEE. In addition to historical factors that once 
divided SEE, one must consider the recent military conflicts, embargoes and politically-
motivated trade wars, which have had a direct impact on trade among SEE countries, 
contributing to a much lower level of trade than otherwise could have been the case.  
 
 
INITIATIVES STIMULATING REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SEE 
 
During the 1990s, a number of initiatives were introduced to stimulate regional cooperation among former 
socialist countries (Lopandic, 1999 or Simic, 1997). These can be divided into two broad groups. The first 
group, launched in 1988-92, was the result of the Socialist bloc’s dissolution, and was addressed to a 
wider group of countries, not only to those in SEE. Among the most important were the Central European 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
8 For example: “At present, 60 per cent-90 per cent of the exports of the countries of Southeastern Europe are to the 
Union” (Finnish Presidency and the European Commission 1999: 4). 
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Initiative (CEI), the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
(BSEC). The second group of initiatives, launched after the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
was directed primarily at the SEE region. Among the most important were the Conference on Good 
Neighborliness, Stability, Security and Cooperation in SEE (CSEE), the Royaumont Process, the Regional 
Approach of the EU, the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) and finally, the Stability Pact 
for SEE. In Table 4, the most important initiatives of regional cooperation are presented, as well as the 
participation of individual SEE transition economies in each. 
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Table 4. Participation of SEE countries in multilateral initiatives of regional  
cooperation 
Country CEI 
(1989) 
CEFTA 
(1992) 
BSEC 
(1992)
CSEE 
(1996)
RP 
(1995) 
EU-RA 
(1996) 
SECI 
(1996) 
SP 
(1999) 
Total 
Albania   +   -   +   +   +   +   +    +  7 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
  +   -    -   O   +   +   +   +  5 + O
Bulgaria   +   +   +   +   +   -   +   +  7 
Croatia   +    -   -   O   +   +   O   +   
4+O+
O 
Macedonia 
FYR 
  +   -   -   +   +   +   +   +  6 
Romania   +    +   +   +   +   -   +   + 7 
Yugoslavia 
FR 
  -   -   -   +   +   +   -    -  3 
CEI: Central European Initiative; CEFTA: Central European Free Trade Area; BSEC: Black Sea 
Economic Co-operation; CSEE: Conference on Stability and Good Neighbourliness in SEE; RP: 
Royaumont Process; EU-RA: European Union Regional Approach; SECI: South East Europe 
Cooperation Initiative; SP: Stability Pact for SEE.  
+: Participant; -: Non-participant; O: Observer. 
Source: Adapted from Lopandic (1999: 79) with some minor modifications. 
 
Why have these initiatives not led to more substantial results, particularly in the SEE 
region?9 Political hostilities among the countries of former Yugoslavia are obviously the 
main explanation: the revival of nationalism and the four wars that accompanied the 
breakup of the Yugoslav federation blocked many possible forms of cooperation among 
SEE countries (Uvalic, 1995). Another important reason is the exclusion of FRY from 
most of these initiatives (see Table 4), even though this country must play a key role in 
regional cooperation. It is a central SEE state, one of the largest, and involved in almost 
all the military conflicts in the region, thus contributing greatly to regional instability. 
Among other shortcomings, these initiatives were all imposed from the outside. Except 
for the CSEE, they were usually backed by limited financial and/or technical resources, 
and most were not comprehensive enough, being limited to one or a few areas.  
 
Since the major responsibility for implementing the newest regional cooperation initiative, 
the Stability Pact, rests today with the EU, it is important to examine EU policies in 
                                                           
9 For a detailed analysis of the advantages and limitations of these initiatives, see Lopandic (1999). 
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recent years. Instead of adopting a consistent, well-defined and long-term strategy for 
the entire SEE region at the beginning of the transition, the EU initially underestimated 
the political problems in the heart of the SEE region (former Yugoslavia). Later, 
constrained by other priorities and problems, it took action only once it was too late to 
prevent a new crisis. The absence of a comprehensive strategy for the Balkans meant 
that the EU applied ad hoc policies to each SEE country. These particularly 
disadvantaged most successor states of former Yugoslavia (see below). As stressed 
recently, “diversity and bilateralism have been the name of the game” (Gligorov et al. 
1999: 38). Awareness that something had to be done on a regional basis came only after 
the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, resulting in the EU Regional Approach 
in1996 for the five countries of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, FYROM and FRY). The EU Regional Approach strongly encouraged closer 
economic and political ties among these countries, but it appeared rather late (after four 
years of military conflicts); it remained vague (with no proposals for concrete programs of 
regional cooperation); it had limited financial backing; and perhaps most important, it 
offered no incentives to these countries to carry forward its main objectives.  
 14
 
Table 5. European Union measures sustaining transition in SEE countries 
                        Multilateral financial assistance    Trade arrangements with EU 
                          Year of inclusion     Total PHARE           Type of trade agreement* 
                           in PHARE      aid 1990-95              & year of conclusion 
                                                           (mln. ECU) 
Albania  Dec.1991  332            TECA: 1992 
Bulgaria  July 1990  476.5            AA: March 1993 
Romania  Jan. 1991  607.7            AA: Feb. 1993 
Slovenia  1992   69 (1992-95)          TECA: 1993; AA: June 1996 
 
Bosnia &  
Herzegovina 1996             **           ATP: 1996 
Croatia    Not yet  **           ATP: 1996 
Macedonia FYR  1996   **                           TECA: June 1996 (in force  
                                                                                              since 1998)                       
Yugoslavia FR Not yet  **                           ATP: 1997 (withdrawn in 
1998) 
 
*TECA: Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement; AA: Association Agreement; ATP: 
Autonomous Trade Preferences taken over from the 1980 Trade and Cooperation Agreement 
with SFR Yugoslavia.  
**All countries of former Yugoslavia other than Slovenia have received a cumulative total of 166 
million ECU over the 1990-95 period. Slovenia has also received part of this sum in 1990-91. 
Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of various sources, in particular Bartlett (1997). 
 
The disadvantaged position of most successor states of former Yugoslavia is 
immediately clear if we consider some of the principal measures applied by the EU to 
sustain the transition in former socialist countries (see Table 5). Whereas Bulgaria, 
Romania, Albania and Slovenia were included in the PHARE program by 1990-92,10 the 
other four SEE countries either became beneficiaries much later (Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and FYROM in 1996) or are still excluded today (Croatia and FRY).11 Only Bulgaria, 
Romania and Slovenia have signed Association Agreements with the EU, while Albania 
and FYROM have the more limited Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreements. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and FRY still have no permanent trade agreement with 
                                                           
10 Former Yugoslavia was also included among PHARE beneficiaries for a short period in 1991,within the PHARE II 
Program, but these provisions were suspended after the country disintegrated. 
11Croatia was formally included among the PHARE beneficiaries in 1995, but this provision was suspended after the 
military takeover of Krajina in August 1995. 
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the EU (though some trade concessions were approved in 1996-97).12 As for accession 
to the EU, only Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia have been accepted as official 
candidates, while even the prospect of EU membership did not arise for the other 
countries until 1999.  
 
Perhaps such EU policies have not made a big difference in practical terms, if we consider that access to 
EU markets for many SEE products is already duty free and that substantial financial resources have 
entered this region through other channels (see below). Nevertheless, these policies have had a number 
of negative consequences (Minic, 1999; Uvalic, 1997a). The fact that EU policies were not backed by a 
comprehensive strategy for the Balkans has had a very deep psychological effect: throughout the 1990s, 
most of these countries felt they had been abandoned, rejected as potential EU members, disregarded for 
integration into Euro-Altantic structures, and thus artificially excluded from Europe, where they feel they 
belong. Moreover, although EU conditionality is fully understandable politically, its economic 
consequences can not be ignored. It must be recognized that essentially favorable EU policies towards 
certain SEE countries and not others, and even the absence of measures sustaining transition (as in the 
case of Croatia and FRY), have had a direct impact on the economic performance and progress toward 
transition of individual SEE countries (Uvalic, 1997a and 1997b). The EU’s highly differential treatment of 
individual SEE countries has also deterred successful implementation of the 1996 EU Regional Approach; 
strict bilateralism undermines the essence of such an approach.  
 
These are some of the reasons why the newest phase of EU policies towards the SEE 
region is extremely important. For the first time in a decade, the Stability Pact adopted in 
June 1999 provides, in addition to “sticks,” an important “carrot”: the prospect of EU 
membership for the five SEE noncandidates. A linchpin of the Stability Pact is the new 
type of agreement that has been conceived for this group of SEE countries, Stabilization 
and Association Agreements (see Kretschmer 1999). Though much skepticism has been 
expressed lately regarding the Stability Pact, because of the exceedingly slow 
implementation of some of its initiatives, its political importance should not be 
underestimated. However, since the continued use of bilateralism based on strict 
conditionality will probably be unavoidable in the future, what seems extremely important 
is that the regional mechanisms envisaged by the Stability Pact are effectively 
implemented and elaborated with sufficient determination. Otherwise, the risk exists that, 
like the EU Regional Approach, the Stability Pact will fail in its main objective: to achieve 
permanent peace, stability and development throughout the SEE region.  
 
                                                           
12 The EU approved autonomous trade preferences to these countries in 1996-97, based on provisions of the Trade and 
Cooperation Agreement concluded in 1980 with former Yugoslavia. 
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Crucial to these efforts to further promote stability and development in SEE is much 
more effective use of financial resources. If we consider the total funds directed toward 
the five countries in the Western Balkans, including EU, bilateral assistance and 
European Bank For Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) funds, we see that the 
amount has been quite substantial, more than 8.2 billion Euro in 1991-99 (see Table 6). 
The largest share of EC-EU resources has been in the form of humanitarian aid provided 
under the ECHO (European Community Humanitarian Office) program, almost 50 per 
cent of total EU funds. This contrast with the minimal amount provided by the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), extended so far only to Albania. Considering that the total 
nominal GDP (at market exchange rates) of these five SEE countries in 1998 was only 
around $46 billion, the total they received in the 1990s actually amounts to as much as 
18 per cent of their GDP (assuming approximately a 1:1 dollar/Euro parity). Since all 
these countries are poorer today than they were in 1989 (see Table 7 below), it is clear 
these funds have gone primarily into consumption and not into investment. Until now, 
Western assistance has helped these countries merely to survive, rather than to develop 
and prosper. To transform SEE into an economically prosperous region, it is extremely 
important that the 5.5 billion Euro envisaged for 2000-2006 as financial assistance to the 
region (see Finnish Presidency and European Commission 1999) is utilized to contribute 
much more to sustainable growth and development of all SEE countries.  
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Table 6. EU Assistance to Western Balkans, 1991-99 (commitments, million EURO) 
 Albania Bosnia & 
H. 
Croatia Yugoslavia Macedonia Total 
(1) 
PHARE 616.4 754.5 49.6 41.7 236.7 1,708.6 
Humanitarian 
Aid  
41.2 1,032.1 290.8 262.8 45.7 1,908.7 
Food Aid 16.5 - - - - 16.5 
Balance of 
Paym. 
20.0 60.0 - - 40.0 120.0 
EIB 46.0 - - - - 46.0 
Other 122.8 221.2 9.3 17.5 2 385.1 
Total EC-EU 862.9 2,067.8 349.7 322 324.4 4,184.9 
EU Bilateral 
(2) 
712.8 507.9 1,165.9 712.4 178.2 3,277.2 
Grand Total 1,575.7 2,575.7 1,515.6 1,034.4 502.4 7,462.1 
EBRD 68.0 70.0 511.0 0.0 143.0 792.0 
Notes: (1) Including EC multi-country programmes (total 258.2 Million Euro); (2) 1990-1997 
Source: Bartlett (1999), based on EU Press Release PR 33/99 May 1999. 
  
For this to become feasible, institutional support is essential. Effective reconstruction of the SEE region, in 
terms of sustainable economic development rather than just physical reconstruction of damaged houses, 
bridges and roads, must have as a key component the creation of new forms of regional economic 
linkages, as was the case in postwar Europe (Bartlett, 1999). Designed to foster regional integration, the 
Marshall Plan was backed by new Europe-wide regional institutions (such as the OECD and the European 
Payments Union) that facilitated intraregional trade. Regional structures designed to promote the 
expansion of trade and other economic links among SEE countries are needed. A multilateral credit 
mechanism should be created for extending credit facilities specifically for such purposes, backed by a 
credible financial organization (for example, the EBRD). Alternatively, as suggested in 1996 by the former 
governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, Dragoslav Avramovic, a common regional fund could be 
created. Its initial capital would consist of the still-undivided foreign exchange reserves of former 
Yugoslavia, which would serve as collateral to attract additional capital on international financial markets. 
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TOWARDS A NEW ERA OF GREATER REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SEE? 
 
Regional cooperation in SEE has never been so important. A comprehensive regional 
strategy for SEE is timely and necessary; it must include all areas (economic, political, 
social, cultural) and all countries. A way must be found to include FRY in all current 
regional cooperation initiatives. Without it, no permanent regional solution is possible 
(Minic, 1999; Bianchini, 2000). The need for such an inclusive strategy stems from an 
increasing awareness that the Balkans’ most relevant problems (stability, democracy, 
development) are strictly correlated and mutually influenced (Bianchini, 2000). Whereas 
closer cooperation in each of the areas would be beneficial in itself, an all-inclusive 
regional strategy could generate various spillover effects — closer cooperation in one 
area could facilitate and reinforce closer cooperation in others.13  
 
Within such a comprehensive regional strategy for peace, democracy and development 
in SEE, there are several economic arguments why closer cooperation among SEE 
countries would be highly beneficial. Before exploring these arguments, it should be 
noted that SEE today is a highly depressed area. In comparison with more advanced 
transition economies, growth performance has been much less satisfactory. Most SEE 
countries are today much worse off than in 1989, with their GDP in 1998 representing 35 
per cent-86 per cent of the 1989 level (see Table 7).  
Table 7. Growth performance of SEE transition economies 
 Real GDP 
in 1998 
(1989=100) 
Year 
recovery 
began 
Reversal 
in trend 
after 
recovery? 
GDP 
average 
growth rate 
1991-95 
GDP 
annual 
growth 
1997 
GDP 
annual 
growth 
1998 
Albania 86 1993 Yes (1997) -2.7 -7.0  8.0 
Bosnia  35 1996 No n.a. 30.0 18.0 
Bulgaria 66 1994 Yes (1996) -3.6 -7.0  3.5 
Croatia 78 1994 Yes (1999) -6.7 6.5  2.3 
Macedonia 72 1996 Yes (1999) -9.6 1.5  2.9 
Romania 76 1993 Yes (1997) -2.2 -6.9 -7.3 
FRY* 51 1994 Yes (1999) -12.4 7.4  2.6 
*Gross Material Product. 
Source: EIU (1996), EBRD (1999), UNECE (1999), EIU (2000). 
 
                                                           
13 Many recent proposals follow these lines (see CEPS 1999; Gligorov et al. 1999; Emerson 1999; Minic 1999; 
Bianchini 2000). 
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At the heart of the SEE region is FRY, which by 1999 became the second poorest 
country in Europe. Only Albania has a lower GDP per capita (EIU 2000). Unemployment 
rates in SEE are much higher than anywhere else in Europe: 42 per cent in FYROM, 38 
per cent in Bosnia and Herzegovina, effectively (though not officially) close to 50 per 
cent in FRY. The only country that has not experienced a reversal in the trend toward 
recovery is Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the country closest to its 1989 GDP level is 
Albania. Recent estimates suggest a further worsening in 1999 of macroeconomic 
indicators for several SEE countries, in particular FRY (Uvalic, 1999).  
 
Presently, therefore, conditions for growth in SEE are not very favorable. SEE countries 
are small and underdeveloped. Economically, they are unimportant, and economic 
cooperation among most of them is weak. For years, they have been isolated due to 
sanctions and embargoes, closed borders, high tariff and nontariff barriers. 
Underdevelopment determines low purchasing power and thus impedes more intense 
trade, stimulating smuggling, illegal trade and the development of underground activities. 
By accelerating economic growth and development, regional economic cooperation 
could help the SEE region pull out of this vicious circle of backwardness.  
 
The main economic arguments for regional cooperation fall within four areas: trade, the 
regional dimension of problems, investment and EU integration. These arguments are 
closely related. Intensifying trade and other economic links among SEE countries could 
contribute to economic recovery and growth, while faster development is crucial for the 
region’s political and economic stability. Only if SEE countries become economically and 
politically stable are they likely to attract more private capital from abroad, and only if 
conditions for more sustainable growth and development are fulfilled, can these 
countries hope to integrate with the rest of Europe. 
 
Trade 
One of the first steps for increasing economic links among SEE countries is to increase 
mutual trade. The majority of SEE countries already have more or less preferential 
access to markets of other regions yet maintain a number of trade barriers among 
themselves. Presently, there are no institutional arrangements through which they could 
exploit the potential of their own region for their own development (Kovac, 1998). Trade 
liberalization could increase regional trade flows, and if foreign trade were to increase 
sufficiently, it could create exceptionally strong impulses for economic development, with 
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both static and dynamic gains (Kovac, 1998). The potential for expanding trade exists 
among some SEE countries, primarily successor states of former Yugoslavia, given that 
most still trade with their former partners. The expected increase in SEE trade may turn 
out to be transitory, but it could nevertheless be highly beneficial. If we consider that over 
the last few years, SEE exports to the EU have been stagnating or declining — with the 
exception of Romania — sluggish export performance in Western markets could be 
compensated by increasing exports to SEE countries, with the additional advantage of 
lower transport costs. Some steps have already been taken in this direction, such as 
bilateral free trade agreements signed by a number of SEE countries.14 As often 
suggested in recent proposals, a South European Free Trade Area (SEFTA) needs to be 
created as soon as possible.  
 
Regional problems 
Especially after the 1999 military conflict in FRY, a number of common problems have 
emerged that will have to be resolved by all SEE countries jointly as part of the 
economic, as well as political and social, reconstruction of the region. Because of these 
common problems that today link all SEE countries much more than in the past, closer 
cooperation among the countries is urgently needed in all fields (infrastructure, 
transportation, Danube issues, migration, energy, ecological damages). These problems 
should be addressed in their regional dimension, requiring close collaboration of all SEE 
countries, otherwise they will be only partially resolved. Regional transnational projects 
are needed to rebuild railways, highways, other transportation routes and the 
communications network. The promotion of trade and economic development also 
depends to a great extent on efficient regional infrastructure networks, wherein 
reintegration of regional infrastructure could lead to important economies of scale. Such 
transnational projects of regional importance will require strong public policy, in which 
bridges, or the river Danube, need to be treated as public goods (Daianu, 1999). 
 
Investment 
Only if SEE countries begin cooperating in different fields — liberalizing trade, 
implementing joint investment projects, intensifying other forms of cooperation — can 
major economic and political stability in the region be achieved, which could substantially 
improve its investment climate. Capital inflows from abroad are of fundamental 
                                                           
14 For example, Slovenia has signed a free trade agreement with Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as has FYROM 
with all countries in the region, including FRY, Bulgaria and Turkey. Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other hand, 
reintroduced some restrictions on trade in 1998 with Croatia and FRY. 
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importance, considering the low level of savings and investment in all SEE countries 
induced by poverty, underdevelopment, general lack of capital and loss of confidence in 
the population. (Four SEE countries — Albania, Bulgaria, FYROM, FRY — have been 
involved in pyramid schemes in recent years). So far, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows to the SEE region have been very limited due to high political risk, foreign 
partners’ interest in other transition economies and the smallness of the markets 
(Romania is an exception). Over the last few years (1996-98), net inflows of FDI into 
SEE have actually trebled (see Table 8). Nevertheless, the cumulative total invested in 
seven SEE countries (excluding Bosnia and Herzegovina but including Slovenia) in 
1989-98 amounts to only $10.7 billion, barely 13 per cent of total FDI net inflows to 26 
transition economies (including FRY), or 18 per cent of the total net inflows of $58 billion 
to 14 CEE, SEE and Baltic countries. However, these seven SEE countries have all 
received more FDI on a per capita basis than the average for the 25 transition 
economies, while three — Croatia, Romania and Slovenia — have received more than 
the average net inflows for CEE, SEE and Baltic states (see Table 8).  
 
Such a low level of FDI is a regional problem that will remain unresolved unless more 
permanent political and economic stability is achieved throughout SEE, which could be 
greatly stimulated by closer transnational cooperation. This is clearly illustrated by the 
case of FYROM. Although it has not been involved in any of the recent military conflicts 
in SEE, it has received the lowest amount of cumulative FDI among all SEE countries, a 
bit over $240 million for 1989-98 (still more than FRY on a per capita basis).  
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Table 8. Net Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment in SEE - 1989-98 (in million US$) 
Country Cumulative FDI 
Inflows (1989-96) 
Cumulative FDI 
Inflows (1989-98) 
Cumulative FDI 
Per capita (1989-98) 
Albania 295 423 132 
Bulgaria 450 1,323 159 
Croatia 564 1,997 444 
Macedonia, FYR 38 242 121 
Romania 1,434 4,510 200 
Slovenia 731 1,192 596 
Yugoslavia, FR 0 1,010 95 
TOTAL FDI in 7 SEE 3,512 10,697 n.a. 
FDI in 26 Transition 
Economies (mln. 
US$) SEE share in 
total (%) 
42,002 
8.36 
82,148 
13.02 
80 
n.a 
FDI in 14 CEE,SEE, 
and Baltic 
countries(mln. US$) 
SEE share in total 
(%) 
30,708 
11.44 
58,461 
18.30 
184 
n.a. 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report Update (1997) and EBRD Transition Report (1999), except 
data for FR Yugoslavia, which is an EIU estimate (EIU, 1999a). The total FDI figures have 
correspondingly been increased by the sum added for FR Yugoslavia. However, the average 
figures for cumulative FDI per capita in 1989-98 are only for the 25 and 13 transition economies 
respectively, thus excluding FR Yugoslavia.  
 
EU integration 
Regional cooperation in SEE could ensure smoother integration of SEE countries into 
the EU. By facilitating mutual trade, implementation of large investment projects and 
major inflow of FDI, faster growth could probably be achieved. This would reduce the 
income gap with respect to those who will enter the EU earlier, leading to faster future 
integration of SEE with other EU members. SEE countries must not have great illusions 
about quick entry into the EU, despite the boldness of some current proposals (CEPS, 
1999; Emerson, 1999). During the past decade, EU enlargement has proceeded so 
slowly, that it will be 14 years (or more) since the fall of the Berlin Wall before even the 
first five CEE countries become EU members. The second round of EU enlargement will 
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require several more years of preparation. Thus, it is highly unlikely that the third round 
— when hopefully the remaining SEE countries will also join — can occur before the 
beginning of the next decade. Until then, SEE countries could continue to compete 
exclusively for expansion and penetration of EU markets, while neglecting neighboring 
countries, or they might choose to promote closer cooperation with other SEE countries, 
while strengthening their EU ties. The second alternative could prove much more 
advantageous over the next ten to 15 years.  
 
Even if one were to reject these economic arguments for promoting regional cooperation 
in SEE and accept the view that there are only weak economic interests pushing in this 
direction, other extremely important non-economic motives exist for intensifying regional 
cooperation. The undefined status of Kosovo and bleak prospects for its early resolution 
make the peace established in mid-1999 extremely fragile, posing concrete political and 
security problems for the SEE region. Therefore, even if the SEE region today may not 
be very integrated economically, there are strong political reasons to promote closer 
economic integration. Just as political motives once divided SEE into two subregions, 
equally important political motives could integrate it today. The need to establish more 
permanent conditions for security, stability, peace and development in the region should 
be a major stimulus for closer cooperation among SEE countries in all fields.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The time has come for SEE countries to abandon hostility and turn to cooperation in 
order to finish the “unfinished peace” that has characterized the Balkans the past decade 
(International Commission on the Balkans, 1996). Closer regional cooperation must be 
promoted primarily in the interest of the SEE countries themselves, but also in the 
interest of all Europe. Now that the EU has shown its interest in helping all SEE 
countries by providing them greater access to EU markets, major financial assistance 
and eventually membership, it is crucial not to waste this important opportunity (Cetinic, 
1999: 132). Increased regional cooperation could help economic recovery, enhance 
security and political stability, diminish criminal and black market cross-border activities, 
open borders and stimulate trade links, FDI and development. For SEE countries, there 
are no alternatives in the medium run but to intensify regional cooperation, and this can 
only facilitate future integration with the EU. 
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Today there is widespread recognition that in SEE, regional problems require regional 
solutions, and therefore cooperation among SEE countries in all fields is necessary. The 
Stability Pact reflects this core conviction. A major problem during this past year has 
been the exclusion of Serbia from all international initiatives, but now that political 
change has taken place and the democratic opposition has come to power (on October 
6, 2000), enabling the official admission also of FR Yugoslavia into the Stability Pact (on 
October 26, 2000), it will definitely be much easier to resolve many regional problems in 
SEE. As recently stressed at the Helsinki summit, nothing can substitute for the political 
will of SEE’s states to cooperate among themselves (see Finnish Presidency and the 
European Commission 1999). And in Serbia today, it does seem that the political will for 
establishing closer ties with neighboring countries is finally there.  
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